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ABSTRACT
This is a survey paper for non-specialists on interactions between
energy and productivity growth. The first half of the paper surveys the
general economic literature linking technical progress to realized gains
in productivity growth. The second half of the survey focuses in
particular on the important role of energy in linking technical progress
to productivity growth, and contains an overview of a great deal of
literature, both classic and recent.

I. INTRODUCTION
The relationships among technical progress, productivity growth and energy
use are not only extremely important, but they are also exceedingly complex. It
is not surprising, therefore, that these interactions can be viewed insightfully
from a number of differing vantages. In this paper I survey the existing
literature, as viewed by an economist.
The outline I follow is as follows: The first half of the paper surveys
the general economic literature linking technical progress to realized gains in
productivity growth. The second half of the survey focuses in particular on the
important role of energy in linking technical progress to productivity growth.
More specifically, in Section II I consider the economic literature relating
technical progress to various types of productivity growth, summarize the
economic framework of cost and production, and distinguish embodied and
disembodied technical progress. This section also contains a very brief
overview on principal empirical findings to date. Then in Section III I narrow
my focus and examine how energy consumption patterns simultaneously effect and
are effected by technical progress and productivity growth. This section
contains an overview of a great deal of literature, both classic and recent.
Finally, in Section IV I present concluding remarks and observations.
Since this survey focuses on energy issues, I will of course overview the
existing literature on the relationship between energy price shocks and the
1973-74 productivity growth slowdown. A number of interesting explanations for
this slowdown have been offered that are essentially unrelated to energy issues
(e.g., US government monetary and fiscal policy in 1973-75 allegedly was not
accommodating), but due to space constraints, I will not discuss them here.1
II. RELATIONSHIPS AMONG TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH:
AN ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
Ever since the pioneering research of Jan Tinbergen [1942] and Robert M.
Solow [1957], the relationships among technical progress and productivity growth
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have been envisaged within the economic theory of cost and production. In the
next few paragraphs, therefore, I present and summarize these theoretical
foundations.
II.A. Cost and Production Functions
Define a set of engineering relationships among inputs and output as the
production function, which indicates the maximum possible flow of output
attainable (denoted Y), given alternative quantity flows of the n inputs
(denoted X1,X2 ,...,Xn) and the state of technical knowledge (denoted A). Write
this production function in impliicit form as
Y = f(X 1 ,X 2,... ,X ;A). (1)
A useful way of viewing the production function relationship is to think
of it as a book whose pages contain alternative blueprint designs for combining
inputs to produce the output level Y. Obviously, the production function and
the book of blueprints must be consistent with laws of nature and other
engineering relationships. While laws of nature are by definition stable and do
not change over time, our understanding and discovery of these laws, as well as
our ability to exploit technological possibilities, has improved with time. One
way of accounting for such advances in the state of technical knowledge,
therefore, is to think of them as adding new pages to the book of blueprints.
For this reason, the variable A is included in the production function (1).
It is often convenient to structure the relationships among technical
progress and productivity growth in terms of the dual cost function. A cost
function indicates the minimum possible total cost C of producing a given level
of output, given prices of the n inputs (denoted P,P 2 .... Pn) and the state of
technical knowledge A. Write the cost function as
C = g(P 1,P2,... ", n;Y;A). (2)
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Obviously, the form of the dual cost function g in (2) must reflect the
parameters of technology embodied in the production function f of (1).
Moreover, it is important to note that advances in technical knowledge that
shift outward the production function, shift downward the dual cost function.
II.B. Factor-Specific and Multifactor Productivity Growth
Early in this century when agriculture played a much larger role in the
economy than it does in industrialized economies today, analysts typically
identified the word productivity with average yield per acre, i.e. Y/Xi , where Y
was yield per year and Xi was the number of acres. This focus in agricultural
economics on yield per acre is but one example of factor-specific productivity.
Another example of factor-specific productivity, namely, average labor
productivity, is more common today than is yield per acre. Average labor
productivity is defined as Y/L -- output divided by labor input -- where labor
input is typically measured as hours at work. On average since World War II, in
both the European and North American economies, average labor productivity in
the manufacturing sector has grown about 2% per year; in Japan the growth rate
in labor productivity over the last two decades has averaged at 5% per year.
Increases in average labor productivity are typically interpreted as being due
to increases in capital per hour at work (capital deepening), scale economies,
and/or advances in the state of technical knowledge (such as, perhaps, learning
which occurs after labor intensive tasks are performed repetitively).
A final example of factor-specific productivity of special relevance here,
commonly known as average energy productivity, Is defined as output divided by
energy input, where the latter can be measured in a number of ways (such as, for
example, ton-equivalents of coal or British thermal units). From the end of
World War II until the early 1970's, in many economies average energy
- Page 4 -
productivity grew at about 1/2% per year, reflecting in part advances in the
state of knowledge. After OPEC-I (1973-74) and especially following OPEC-II
(1979-80), average energy productivity increased more rapidly, due in large part
to the replacement of energy-inefficient capital equipment with more energy-
efficient designs.
These are but three examples of factor-specific productivity growth
measures. One could, of course, think of other inputs and then compute their
average productivity growth rates. Rather than doing that, however, I belive it
is more useful to consider the determinants affecting growth rates of factor-
specific productivities. Begin by simply dividing both sides of the production
function (1) by Xi , thereby obtaining
Y/Xi = f(XX 2 ... Xn;A)/Xi, (3)
which indicates that growth in factor-specific productivity for the ith input
generally depends on the levels of all n inputs, as well as advances in the
state of technical knowledge. Alternatively, as long as firms minimize costs,
one can employ the cost function notion and obtain optimal (cost-minimizing)
input-output coefficients for each of the n inputs into production, invert them
and obtain factor-specific productivity measures as
Y/X i = h(P,P 2 .... Pn;Y;A). (4)
Equation (4) highlights the fact that factor-specific productivity
measures are dependent on, inter alia, the prices of the n inputs. This
dependence is closely related to the notion of price elasticity of demand. In
particular, consider the following experiment: Suppose the price of the jth
input changes, all other input prices remain fixed, while the state of
technology A and the level of output Y also remain fixed. By how much does the
optimal (cost-minimizing) demand for the ith input change?
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This price responsiveness of demand for input i is called the price
elasticity of demand, and is typically formulated in logarithmic terms as
; In X.
ij l In P. Y=Y, A=A, P = P (kj) .
j k k
Now define the average productivity elasticity nij as the response in the
average productivity of the ith input due to a change in the price of the jth
input, where all other input prices, the state of technology and the level of
output are fixed, i.e.
a In (Y/X.
n - 2 (6)ij 8 in P. Y=Y, A=A, P k= Pk (kfj) (6)
One can easily show that the average productivity elasticity nij is simply the
negative of the price elasticity cij, i.e. ilij = - cij"
Consider, for example, the fact that a number of econometric studies have
shown that in many manufacturing processes, energy and labor are substitutable
inputs. As the price of labor increases, ceteris paribus, firms substitute away
from labor and towards energy; this implies that the price elasticity CEL > 0
(where E is energy and L is labor). This energy-labor substitutability also
implies that the average energy productivity elasticity with respect to labor is
negative, i.e. nEL < 0; increases in the price of labor, ceteris paribus, induce
substitution away from labor (increasing Y/L) and towards energy (thereby
decreasing the average energy productivity Y/E).
While factor-specific average productivity measures contain useful summary
information, they are subject to one very serious objection. Namely, it is not
at all clear that increases in factor-specific average productivity are always
desirable.2 Consider, for example, average labor productivity. As capital
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machines initially substituted for labor, Y/L increased. This capital-labor
substitution could conceivably continue virtually forever, until finally a given
level of output could be produced with but one unit of labor and an incredibly
complex and expensive network of robots, computers and machines. While this
extremely high level of Y/L might be possible in an engineering sense, it could
also be very expensive -- the combined capital and labor costs in such a low
labor, high capital-intensive setting could be much higher than if more labor
and less capital were employed. Similarly, one might in fact be able to build
"super machines" that were incredibly energy efficient (near the limits implied
by the laws of thermodynamics), but the combined energy and capital costs of
operating such energy efficient machines might be considerably larger than if
less energy-efficient designs were employed instead.
These two examples highlight the important economic fact that firms,
households and societies are not necessarily better off simply because the
factor-specific productivity of some input has increased; the consumption of
other inputs may have increased as a result, and thus the total resource costs
to society might be larger, the same as, or less than before. What is needed is
a measure of productivity growth that recognizes the fact that all inputs are
scarce, and that the desired productivity growth is that growth which results
from the combined savings over all inputs, not just one input.
This consideration has led to the notion of multifactor productivity (MFP)
growth, defined as growth in output minus growth in aggregate input, i.e.
MFP E A/A = Y/Y - X/X, (7)
where growth in aggregate input is a weighted sum of growth in the individual
inputs, i.e.
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n
/X = E w. (ki/X.) (8)
i=1
with the wi weights being cost shares of the ith input in total costs of
production.
Unlike factor-specific productivity measures, increases in MFP growth are
always desirable, for they indicate that more output is being obtained from a
given bundle of inputs. Due in large part to this clearer interpretation, major
national statistical agencies, such as the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, are
now calculating and publishing measures of MFP growth on a regular basis.
While MFP growth measures are therefore in theory clearly preferable to
factor-specific productivity growth measures, in practice the measurement of MFP
growth requires more data than factor-specific productivity -- price and
quantity measures of all inputs are necessary. In this context, it is important
to recognize that the calculated MFP residual in (8) may in fact reflect not
only the effects of advances in the state of knowledge, but also a host of
measurement errors.
II.C. Embodied and Disembodied Technical Progress
In the previous paragraphs I have presented alternative measures of
productivity growth, and have argued that for most purposes the MFP growth
measure is preferable to single-factor measures. This raises the next important
issue: How are various types of advances in knowledge related to MFP growth?
Over the last few decades an extensive literature has developed in
economics and economic history concerning the classification of technical
progress. One important distinction frequently made is that between embodied
and disembodied technical progress. 3
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Embodied technical progress refers to engineering design and performance
advances that can only be embodied in new plant or equipment; older equipment
cannot be made to function as economically as the new, unless a costly remodel-
ling or retrofitting of equipment occurs. To the extent that technical progress
is embodied, its effects on costs and production depend critically on the rate
of diffusion of the new equipment, which in turn depends on investment and the
resulting vintage composition of the surviving capital stock.
By contrast, disembodied technical progress refers to advances in
knowledge that make more effective use of all inputs, including capital of each
surviving vintage (not just the most recent vintage). In its pure form,
disembodied technical progress proceeds independently of the vintage structure
of the capital stock. The most common example of disembodied technical progress
is perhaps the notion of learning curves, in which it has been found that for a
wide variety of production processes and products, as cumulative experience and
production increase, learning occurs which results in ever decreasing unit
costs. Some have called this type of learning process "learning by doing,"
"learning through the examples of others," or "learning by using." Classic
examples include the production of aircraft frames and ships during World War
II.4
While the distinction between embodied and disembodied technical progress
is in principle quite clear, in practice and in history one frequently finds
that these two types of technical progress interact with one another in a
complex and dynamic manner. This will be discussed further in Section III.A.
II.D. A Brief Summary of the Principal Recent Empirical Findings on
Multifactor Productivity Growth
A great deal of literature has appeared in the last twenty years
concerning abrupt changes in multifactor (MFP), labor and energy productivity
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growth since 1970. Detailed reviews and critiques of this literature can be
found in, among others, Martin N. Baily [1981], Ernst R. Berndt and David 0.
Wood [1986a,b]. Edward F. Denison [1985], John W. Kendrick [1983], Assar
Lindbeck [1983], J. Randolph Norsworthy, Michael Harper and Kent Kunze [1979],
and Mancur Olson [1988].
The first important common finding of this literature is that in virtually
all countries, MFP and labor productivity growth rates declined sharply
following the 1973-74 and 1979-80 OPEC oil price shocks. This temporal
coincidence between productivity growth breaks and energy price shocks has
naturally focused much attention on the relationship between unexpected energy
price changes and productivity growth.5
A second important finding is that in the manufacturing sectors of Canada
and especially the U.S.. MFP growth began falling much earlier than 1973-74 --
as far back as 1965. For Japan, however, the sharp break in MFP occured only
after 1973-74. Moreover, MFP growth increased following investment spurts -- in
the U.S., after 1977-80, and in Japan, after 1965 and before 1977.
A third significant set of findings is that measures of MFP growth depend
critically on how one adjusts the inputs for quality change, and how one also
adjusts for short-run cyclical changes in capacity utilization. Either of these
adjustments can be decisive.
A fourth key finding in the empirical literature to date is that gains in
energy conservation -- increases in average energy productivity -- typically
followed the energy price shocks with a considerable time lag, and accelerated
only after substantial investment occurred. This result simply reflects the
fact that major changes in energy use patterns can occur only as the capital
stock is replaced with more energy-efficient capital.
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Fifth, data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics show a resurgence in
the growth rates of labor and multifactor productivity beginning in 1983,
particularly in the manufacturing sector.6 Note that in about 1983 in the US,
real energy prices again began to fall.
Sixth and finally, the time patterns of labor, energy and multifactor
productivity growth have differed considerably over the last twenty years, both
within and among the various sectors of the OECD economies. An important
implication of this, therefore, is that one must be careful and precise before
talking about "the" productivity growth slowdown.
Having presented the economic framework in which technical progress and
various types of productivity growth can be considered, and having very briefly
reviewed the principal empirical evidence to date, I now focus on energy
consumption and turn to an examination of interactions among energy use,
technical progress and productivity growth.
III. ENERGY USE, TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
In this section I focus on the important role of energy use in interacting
with technical progress and productivity growth. I will attempt to demonstrate
the insights one can obtain from the economic framework reviewed in the previous
pages. Four examples will be given, each of which in one way or another
illustrates the importance of embodied and disembodied technical progress.
III.A. THE SCHURR HYPOTHESIS: AN EXAMPLE OF INTERACTIONS BETWEEN EMBODIED
AND DISEMBODIED TECHNICAL PROGRESS
In a series of studies beginning in the early 1950's, Sam Schurr and his
associates have hypothesized that the electrification of US industry in the
early twentieth century contributed significantly both to labor and MFP growth. 7
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This hypothesis is of special interest to productivity analysts, for it implies
that even if labor and electricity were substitutable inputs in production
(recall the discussion in Section II.B above), increases in electrification
still resulted in both enhanced labor and MFP growth, i.e. the technical
progress effects dominated the substitution effects.
The Schurr hypothesis in fact incorporates several hypotheses concerning
the distinct and interactive contributions of electrification to productivity
growth via embodied and disembodied technical progress. In essence it portrays
the interaction between one type of energy having a special flexible form --
electricity -- and the introduction and adoption of new capital equipment and
machinery driven by this new energy form.
More specifically, at the turn of the century electricity and the fluid
fuels came into increasing use, due in large part to their relative abundance,
their low prices, and their flexibility property relative to the solid fuels
that had previously dominated energy supply. In the case of electricity,
technical progress was embodied in the sense that low-cost electricity was now
available from more efficient steam generation, and no longer required access to
water wheels and running water.
In turn, these characteristics of electricity -- low cost, abundance and
enhanced flexibility in use -- provided the seeds for the discovery, development
and use of new product innovations. According to the historical literature,
these advances in technical knowledge eventually led to the design and introduc-
tion of new "group drive" and ultimately "unit drive" machinery and equipment,
thereby rationalizing the factory floor and inducing additional process
innovations. In particular, the factory floors could now be laid out in a more
logical, natural manner, using perhaps the new scientific management principles
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of Frederick Taylor, rather than being physically constrained by systems of
belts and shafts. This demonstrates the interactive and dynamic nature of
embodied and disembodied technical progress, and between product and process
innovations.
One other feature of the Schurr hypothesis that has not received much
attention is the important role of market structure in facilitating the
diffusion of technical progress. In particular, electricity generating
companies early on discovered the importance of scale economies, and this
created possibilities for natural monopoly. Had natural monopolies been
permitted to operate without any interference, the prices charged by the
monopolies could have exceeded production costs and thereby could have slowed
down the diffusion process considerably. What actually happened, of course, is
that rather early in their history these electricity generating companies were
regulated, prices were set so that economic profits were approximately zero, and
promotional pricing strategies and policies were adopted that resulted in low
electricity prices and rapid diffusion.
As a final comment, it is worth noting that the Schurr hypothesis has been
implemented and assessed using econometric methods. In particular, based on
pooled cross-section and time series data by state from the 1909, 1914 and 1919
censuses in the U.S., Berndt and Wood [1984b] have quantified the effects of
electrification in the total manufacturing and cotton goods industries. Among
their findings is the result that already in the 1909-1919 time period, prior to
the very rapid increase in electrification, variations among states in overall
horsepower and, more importantly, their electrified horsepower per unit of
capital, had important and positive labor productivity effects, over and above
the additional costs incurred by the manufacturing and cotton goods firms in
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purchasing such equipment. Related econometric findings on the Schurr
hypothesis have also been reported by Woolf [1980,1983,1984] and Berndt [1986].
III.B. THE BIASED TECHNICAL CHANGE HYPOTHESIS: DISEMBODIED TECHNICAL
PROGRESS
A rather different body of literature indicating a special role for both
electric and non-electric energy inputs in the productivity growth process has
appeared in the last decade, and is typically referred to as the biased
technical change hypothesis. Its principal spokesman has been Dale W.
Jorgenson.8
Using the theory of cost and production, Jorgenson specifies a production
model that employs historical data for 35 industries in the U.S.. He then
estimates parameters in systems of input demand equations for capital, labor,
energy, and non-energy intermediate materials. The right-hand or "explanatory"
variables in these statistical demand equations are prices of the inputs and
time (the latter, 1 in 1958, the first year of the sample, 2 in 1959, etc.).
This time variable represents an attempt to capture the effects of disembodied
technical progress, which implicitly is assumed to increase lockstep with the
passage of time. Within this framework, no attempt is made to account
explicitly for embodied technical change.9
Based on annual US data since 1958, Jorgenson obtains the striking finding
that in almost every one of the 35 sectors examined, the estimated parameter on
the time variable in the energy cost share demand equations is positive. This
implies that technical progress is energy using.
Before proceeding further, I believe it may be useful to provide some
interpretation on what is meant by input-using or input-saving technical
progress. When technical progress occurs, the same amount of output can now be
produced using fewer total inputs. The proportional savings on some inputs,
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however, might be larger than for other inputs. Technical progress is said to
be input i-using (input i-saving) if the proportional savings on the ith input
is less than (greater than) the average proportional savings over all inputs,
respectively. Finally, technical progress is said to be input i-neutral if the
proportional savings on the ith input just equals the average proportional
savings over all inputs. Since the estimated coefficient on the time variable
in most of Jorgenson's energy cost share demand equations was positive, this
implied that technical progress was energy-using.
Although the intuition is not completely obvious, it turns out that when
technical progress is input i-using (i-saving), increases in the relative price
of the ith input result in a lower (higher) rate of multifactor productivity
growth. While this is essentially a mathematical result, its implications are
very important. In particular, Jorgenson's finding that in virtually all
sectors of the U.S. economy, technical progress is total energy using implies
that increases in the relative price of energy forms, other things equal, result
in reduced MFP growth.10 Moreover, similar findings have been reported by
Berndt-Hesse [1986] using data for the manufacturing sectors of nine OECD
countries, 1960-81; the Berndt-Hesse findings are also significant in that one
of Jorgenson's other key assumptions -- that capital plant and equipment adjusts
entirely within one year to price changes -- was relaxed by Berndt-Hesse.
The Jorgenson biased technical change findings highlight some very
important but difficult questions. Among them are the following: Just how has
disembodied technical progress affected demand for energy? What types of engi-
neering examples correspond with this econometric finding? How can one inter-
pret the additional econometric finding of Jorgenson that the input-using bias
is larger for non-electric energy than for electric energy? Do Jorgenson's
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findings based on a disembodied technical progress specification have any rela-
tionship to the Schurr hypothesis, which involves the interaction of embodied
and disembodied technical progress? As of this point in time, our understanding
of the energy-using biased technical progress hypothesis is still rather weak.
III.C. ELECTRIFICATION AND THE QUALITY OF AGGREGATE ENERGY
After World War II and until the late 1960's it was commonly believed that
economic growth in the U.S. since 1929 was due primarily to technical progress.
The stylized fact taught in most economics courses was that about 10% of growth
in output was due to growth in input, and the remaining 90% was unexplained and
therefore thought to be due to technical progress.
In a pioneering article, Dale Jorgenson and Zvi Griliches [1967]
challenged this conventional wisdom, arguing that previous analysts failed to
account properly for input quality changes. More specifically, they first
argued that labor input had changed considerably over time, for by the late
1960's the average worker was more highly educated and more productive than
he/she was two decades earlier.11 Jorgenson-Griliches therefore developed a new
measure of labor input that accounted for changes over time in educational
attainment, and then called this new labor input measure a quality-adjusted
labor input.
Similarly, Jorgenson-Griliches also argued that traditional measures of
capital input failed to account properly for quality change. In particular,
they argued that since 1945, the composition of capital investment changed
considerably away from non-residential structures and toward producers' durable
equipment. Since the economic life of structures is typically much longer than
that for equipment, a dollar spent in year t on acquiring new equipment would
yield more services that year than a dollar spent in year t on acquiring new
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buildings or structures. This implied that the aggregate capital input measure
should reflect the effects of the changing composition, for neglecting this
would fail to account for the increased services yielded by the on average
younger capital stock. Jorgenson-Griliches then went on to develop a new
measure of capital input, and called it a quality-adjusted capital input. 12
The result of these two input quality adjustments on the measurement of
the role of MFP growth was enormous. Although some controversy ensued, by the
early 1970's it had become clear that for the US since World War II, about 50%
(rather than 10%) of growth in output was due to growth in input, and the
remaining 50% (rather than 90%) was due to disembodied technical progress.
While the above discussion is of interest, the reader may wonder what its
relationship is to energy usage. As I shall now argue, the issues underlying
the adjustment of energy input for quality change over time are completely
analogous to those underlying the adjustment of labor and capital inputs. In
particular, one could measure aggregate energy input over time by a physical
measure such as tons of coal equivalent, or British thermal units, just as one
could measure labor input in terms of live bodies at work. Such measures would,
however, fail to account for quality change over time.
Already in 1960 Schurr and Netschert had recognized the importance of
input quality change over time, not just for labor, but also for energy. For
example:
"The composition of the labor force has changed, and so has the
composition of the fuel and power basket. Workers are, in general,
better educated, and, similarly, certain energy commodities in use today
are an improvement over those used seventy-five years ago (a kilowatt
hour is, in this sense, a pound of coal with a college education)."
Schurr-Netschert [1960], p. 173.
There is of course a long literature on measuring the quality of energy,
where quality has a clear thermodynamic foundation involving its availability to
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do work. Within that literature, it is well-known that electricity has a very
high quality. Following Schurr-Netschert, here I will use the phrase "energy
quality" in a more general manner, and simply note that this usage is not
inconsistent with the implications of thermodynamics.
In essence, the changing composition of energy toward electricity and away
from first the solid fuels, and more recently, the liquid fuels, implies that
the average quality of aggregate energy has improved over time, and that this
quality change should be incorporated into MFP growth calculations. One
possible way of doing this, which may elicit sympathy from some engineers, is to
compute an aggregate measure for energy in which electricity is weighted by the
average number of British thermal units used to generate a kilowatt hour. If
this were done, electricity input today would be weighted by approximately
10,000 Btu's per kilowatt hour, instead of the common 3412 Btu's per kilowatt
hour procedure based on their mechanical equivalence; for periods earlier in
this century when electricity generation was less efficient, the weight would be
approximately 20,000 Btu's per kilowatt hour. One problem with such a procedure
is that it does not really deal well with electricity generated by hydropower or
nuclear energy. A preferable procedure, and significantly, one based very
firmly in the economic theory of index numbers, is to weight the various types
of energy by their prices, for in this way their marginal value to users is
quantified.13
In order to obtain a quantitative notion of how important it is to
quality-adjust energy input, in Table 1 below I present several alternative
measures of energy input in the manufacturing sectors of the U.S. and Japan.
These figures are taken from Berndt, Sagawa, Sawa and Wood (1986].
As seen in the columns with the heading "Physical Energy Intensity"
(defined as a Btu measure of aggregate energy divided by real output, and
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indexed to 100 in 1974), in the US the traditional engineering measure of energy
intensity declined only very slightly from 1965 to 1973, then dropped much more
dramatically (at an average annual growth rate -- AAGR -- of 3.70%) following
OPEC-I. Over the entire 1965-81 time period, physical energy intensity (average
physical energy productivity) decreased (increased) at an AAGR of 1.96%.
While numbers such as these are often used to herald energy conservation:
gains in the US, they can be misleading in that the average quality of energy
(where the component energy types are weighted by their prices, not their
relative Btu contents) has increased. In choosing their energy inputs, firms
are increasingly moving to higher quality energy types. This implies that
quality-adjusted energy intensity has not fallen as rapidly as traditional
physical measures of aggregate energy intensity. From 1965 to 1973 in the US,
the AAGR in energy quality was 0.35%, and this increased substantially to 1.23%
from 1974 to 1981; over the entire 1965-81 time period, energy quality in U.S.
manufacturing increased at an AAGR of 0.81%.
Once one properly accounts for the improved energy quality, therefore, the
apparent gains in energy conservation for the U.S. are not as large as commonly
stated. This is not to be interpreted negatively, but simply indicates that
manufacturing firms are increasingly turning toward the economically more
efficient electricity and away from the liquid fuels. In the US, for example,
the economic energy intensity (or, quality-adjusted energy intensity) declined
0.21% from 1965 to 1973, and then dropped much more sharply with an AAGR of
2.53% from 1974 to 1981. Over the entire 1965-81 time perJod, average energy
intensity adjusted for quality change dropped at an AAGR of 1.17%. What this
implies, therefore, is that about 40% of the apparent gains in energy conserva-
tion since 1965 in the U.S. are in fact due to improvements in energy quality.
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Table 1
Physical and Quality-Adjusted Measures of Aggregate Energy Intensity
in the Manufacturing Sectors of the U. S. and Japan (1974=100)
United States Japan
Energy Economic
Quality Intensity
Physical
Intensity
105.4
105.1
105.8
107.7
110.0
112.8
115.0
109.5
104 .3
100.0
104.0
97.7
91.4
86.6
85.1
81.6
76.8
-1.96
-0.13
-3.70
-2.95
-3.92
100.9
100.6
102.5
104.1
106.4
109.2
110.3
106.2
102.6
100.0
106.0
101.6
97.5
93.4
90.7
87.8
83.6
95.7
95.7
96.9
96.7
96.7
96.8
95.9
97.0
98.4
100.0
101.9
104.0
106.7
107.8
106.6
107.6
108.9
0.81
0.35
1.23
2.18
0.34
Physical
Intensity
101.7
103.0
94.7
92.3
93.5
92.4
90.0
91.4
100.9
100.0
Year
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
Energy Economic
Quality Intensity
105.3
101.3
103.2
102.5
99.3
98.9
100.1
100.3
98.2
100.0
103. 2
104.4
105.4
106.8
108.4
110.4
111.7
113.7
116.7
0 .37
-0.87
1.59
1.77
1.51
2.64
107.1
104.3
97.7
94.6
92.8
91.4
90.1
91.7
99.1
100.0
98.1
97.1
95.5
93.0
89.9
86.0
77.5
72.5
70.6
-2.00
-0.97
-3.58
-1.52
-5.90
-2.62
Notes: Physical intensity is aggregate energy in Btu equivalents divided by
output. Energy quality is the economic price-weighted aggregate of energy
divided by the Btu aggregate of energy. In both the above Btu calculations
1 kilowatt hour of electricity = 3412 Btu's. The economic intensity is the
product of the first two columns. AAGR is the average annual growth rate.
Source: Berndt, Sagawa, Sawa and Wood [1986].
95.1
93.0
90.6
87.1
82.7
77.9
69.4
63.8
60.5
-2.36
-0.10
-5.08
-3.24
-7.29
-5.17
1980
1981
1982
1983
AAGR
1965-81
1965-73
1974-81
1974-77
1978-81
1982-83
-1.17
-0.21
-2.53
-0.84
-3.63
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For Japan, energy quality improvements are also very important, especially
since 1974. As seen in the second set of columns in Table 1, from 1965 to 1973
the index of physical energy intensity stayed at roughly the same level
(although it dropped until 1968 and then rose until 1973). From 1974 to 1981,
however, the physical energy intensity fell at a rate of slightly larger than 5%
per year, compared with the 3.7% rate of decrease in the U.S. This 5% drop per
year in physical energy intensity continued in Japan through 1982 and 1983.
While the physical energy intensity measure is of interest, as noted
earlier it masks important compositional changes in energy consumption that
affect aggregate energy quality. In Japan, interestingly, average energy
quality actually dropped from 1965 to 1973 (unlike the US), but since 1974 the
role of energy quality changes has been almost identical in Japan and the US.
Specifically, for Japan over the 1974--81 time period, while physical
energy intensity dropped at an AAGR of 5.08%, energy quality increased at an
AAGR of 1.59%, implying that the economic energy intensity fell at approximately
3.58% per year. Hence for Japan, energy quality improvements resulted in about
a 33% reduction in apparent energy conservation gains (the latter based on
physical weights). For the US, the corresponding growth rates during the same
1974-81 time period are -3.70% for physical energy intensity, 1.23% for energy
quality increases, and -2.53% for economic energy intensity. This implies that
since 1974 in the US, as in Japan, the relative role of energy quality
improvements was about 33% -- improvements in energy quality reduced apparent
energy conservation gains by about one-third. Notice also that for Japan, in
the last two years of the sample (1982-83) the energy quality proportion
increases to over 50%.
In summary, therefore, the changing composition of energy inputs in the
manufacturing sectors of the US and Japan toward electricity and away from the
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liquid fuels has resulted in an increase in the average quality of the aggregate
energy input. This more effective, more productive aggregate energy input
should be properly accounted for when undertaking average energy and MFP growth
calculations.
III.D. ENERGY PRICE SHOCKS AND THE QUALITY OF CAPITAL: MEASUREMENT ISSUES
The fourth and final example of the special relationship among energy
usage, technical progress and productivity growth concerns the impacts of
unexpected energy price changes. Essentially, the argument here is that when
energy price shocks occur, utilization rates of the various surviving vintages
of capital adapt, and as a result the flow of services per unit of capital stock
is altered. Such changes in the flow/stock relationship are unlikely to be
uncovered by traditional measures of capital input, and as a result, since MFP
growth is computed as growth in output minus growth in aggregate input, MFP
growth will be incorrectly measured. The implications of this measurement issue
are not trivial. If, for example, growth in real capital input is overstated
since 1973 due to utilization reductions, then so too would be the growth of
aggregate input; as a consequence, growth in the MFP productivity residual would
be understated. Some background comments might be of help here.14
In the short-run, the services available from capital equipment are
largely fixed, and so too are the operating characteristics of the equipment.
Although considerable energy-capital substitutability is possible ex ante, once
capital is put into place the ratio of energy consumption to capital services
actually utilized is fixed. The relationship between energy and utilized
capital services is then one of putty-clay -- malleable ex ante, fixed ex post.
This ex post fixity is extremely important, for it implies that when firms
make decisions concerning the optimal energy efficiency for long-lived capital
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equipment they are about to purchase, expectations of future relative energy
prices over the likely lifetime of the asset are critical. In a very important
sense, therefore, at any point in time the various surviving vintages of capital
equipment each embody an energy efficiency reflecting the relative energy price
expectations prevailing when the equipment was originally acquired.
Even though ex post fixity is common for energy use, dramatic changes in
operating costs may alter the pattern of utilization across differing capital
vintages embodying varying operating characteristics, decreasing in particular
the utilization of energy inefficient vintages relative to the more efficient
ones. Scrapping plans may also be changed, accelerating the scrappage of energy
inefficient equipment. As investment occurs and some of the energy-inefficient
vintages are gradually replaced, the patterns of utilization across vintages
adapt as well.
If this view is correct, then the energy price increases of the 1970's
altered vintage-specific utilization rates, and thus changed the relationship
between the flow of capital services and the stock of capital. Since the
traditional procedure for measuring the flow of capital services in a given
period involves first estimating the capital stock (adjusting for inflation) and
then assuming a fixed proportionality over time in the ratio of service flows to
stocks, the conventional procedure cannot accommodate the effects of energy
price-induced variations in the proportionality factor between service flows and
capital stocks.
Impressive features of this hypothesis are that, (i) it is completely
consistent with the historical evidence of a slow and gradual, rather than
instantaneous improvement in energy efficiency since 1973, (ii) it is consistent
with the sluggish turnover of energy-inefficient capital plant and equipment
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that accelerated during the OPEC-II epoch in most OECD countries, and (iii) it
may also be consistent with the dramatic changes that occurred in the post-OPEC
stock market valuations of capital in energy-using sectors such as
manufacturing. Moreover, since this hypothesis involves interactions between
capital and energy inputs, it highlights the complex and important relationships
among energy, capital utilization, investment, embodied technical progress, and
measured MFP growth.15
All this is very plausible, but how important is it empirically? Somewhat
surprisingly, the empirical research to date attempting to quantify this capital
measurement error has yielded only modest results. Berndt and Wood [1986a,b]
report, for example, that for the US manufacturing sector the post-OPEC slowdown
in multifactor productivity growth may have been ove:•stated by as much as 20%,
while for the UK the estimated magnitude is less than half that. Such
measurement error numbers are substantial, but they also indicate that our
knowledge concerning causes of the MFP growth slowdown of the 1970's (and back
perhaps as far as 1965) is still disappointingly small. 16
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper I have attempted to survey and interpret several of the most
important economic aspects underlying the relationships among technical
progress, productivity growth and energy use. I began by focusing on the
economic theory of cost and production, distinguished factor-specific from MFP
growth, and embodied from disembodied technical progress.
I then briefly summarized the most salient empirical regularities of the
last few decades, and noted in particular that quite frequently the factor-
specific and MFP growth measures moved in different ways, implying that one
should be cautious about talking about "the" productivity growth slowdown.
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In the second half of the paper, I focused on the special role of energy
consumption in inducing and reflecting the effects of technical progress and
productivity growth. Four examples were chosen to highlight the special role of
energy: (i) the Schurr electrification hypothesis, which dramatizes the
interactive nature of embodied and disembodied technical progress; (ii) the
biased technical change hypothesis, which depends critically on disembodied
technical progress, but whose underlying engineering interpretation is not yet
clear; (iii) the energy quality issue, which highlights the fact that not all
British thermal units are identical, and that the changing composition of energy
towards electricity in the last few decades implies that physical measures ofý
aggregate energy input should be adjusted for quality change; and (iv), the
energy price-induced change in utilization of capital plant and equipment issue.
which points to the importance of the fixity of capital plant and equipment, and
tends to result in overstatements of the MFP growth slowdown after 1973.
While the four examples are varied, they contain a common theme which is
worth noting once again. In thinking about relationships among energy usage,
technical progress and productivity growth, I believe three concepts are
indispensable: embodiment, diffusion and learning. It is an understatement to
note that economists do not have an intellectual monopoly on these concepts.
While economic thinking can contribute significantly to understanding the forces
linking energy usage, technical progress and productivity growth, economists
have a great deal to learn from colleagues in the engineering and physical
sciences, from those in other social sciences, and from historians.
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FOOTNOTES
1Discussions of these explanations have been presented and surveyed by, among
others, Lindbeck [1983], Maddison [1987], Mork [1988] and Olson [1988].
2For a more detailed discussion of factor-specific and multifactor
productivity growth in the context of cost and production functions, see
Berndt [1978,1980] and Berndt-Fuss [1986].
3For more detailed discussions of the notions of embodied and disembodied
technical progress, see Solow [1957,1960].
4The classic analytical study of the effects of learning on production and
costs is that by Arrow [1962]. For additional discussion of learning curves,
and more extensive historical references, see chapter 3 in Berndt [1990].
5Denison reports, however, that this temporal coincidence is to some extent a
result of aggregation. When quarterly rather than annual series are employed,
BLS data suggest that the 1973-74 slowdown in labor productivity slightly
preceded the rise in oil prices from OPEC I. For further discussion, see
Denison [1985], pp. 52-56.
6See "News: Productivity and Costs", a regular publication of the US
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washington, DC 20212.
7 In addition to the original classic study by Schurr-Netschert [1960], a
number of other researchers have examined various aspects of the Schurr
hypothesis. Included among such studies are Berndt [1986], Devine
[1983a,b;1984], DuBoff [1966,1967], Jorgenson [1986], Rosenberg [1983], Schurr
[1982,1984] and Woolf [1980,1983,1984,1987].
8The first publication in this literature is Jorgenson-Fraumeni [1981], in
which energy was treated as an aggregate; also see Jorgenson [1988]. In
subsequent work such as Jorgenson [1984,1986], energy is disaggregated into
electric and non-electric energy.
9To some extent, of course, the price deflators for new investment goods
incorporate "quality change". On this, see Griliches [1971], chapter 4 in
Berndt [1990], and Gordon [1990].
10The pattern of biased technical change is more diverse when energy is broken
down into electric and non-electric energy; although no single pattern
dominates, Jorgenson's most common finding is that the input-using bias is
larger for non-electric than for electric energy.
11Jorgenson and Griliches were not the first to attempt to measure labor
quality in the productivity context (Denison had also done so), but their
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framework was the first to do so in a symmetric manner for all inputs, within
a consistent and rigorous theoretical framework based on the theory of cost
and production.
12A major problem in measuring quality changes in capital input lie with the
official government deflators used to measure real investment. For further
discussion, see Griliches [1971], chapter 4 in Berndt [1990], as well as
Gordon [1990].
131ndex number issues, with particular emphasis on energy, are discussed in
detail in Berndt [1978]. For a related application, see Marlay [1984].
14This argument has been called by some the "Baily hypothesis" (see Baily
[1981]), and is presented in greater detail in Berndt-Wood [1984,1986a,b].
15In contrast to this short-run relationship between energy price shocks and
measured capital input, a longer term relationship between energy prices and
multifactor productivity involves energy-capital complementarity, in which
energy price changes are found to reduce demands for both energy and capital.
To the extent this is true and to the extent that new investment goods are the
carriers of technical progress (due to embodiment), energy price increases
could in the long run reduce the rate of MFP growth. Empirical evidence on
the energy-capital complementarity hypothesis, and its implications for long-
run productivity growth, is found in Berndt-Wood [1986a,b].
16A closely related issue concerns the effects of energy price shocks on the
depreciation patterns and second-hand values of energy-using equipment with
fixed energy efficiencies. Using data on various types of second-hand
transactions for energy-using equipment, Hulten, Robertson and Wykoff [19891
find that energy price shocks had only a very small impact on the depreciation
patterns and prices of such energy-using equipment.
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